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UNRAVELLING CHINA'S GRADUAL
APPROACH TO EQUITY
CROWDFUNDING REGULATION
CHEN Li* AND YU QIANQIAN**
Crowdfunding is a phenomenon that has seen stunning growth since the
early 2010s. With the advent of the Internet, it has become an
increasinglycommonplace method offundraising, especiallyfor startups
and small and medium enterprises. Of the different types of
crowdfunding, equity crowdfunding ("ECF") carriesthe unique traitsof
securities offering, and thus poses significant risks for investors and
market regulators alike. Various jurisdictions have taken a stride to
implement specific laws and regulations that specifically target such
activities, while the rest have made modifications to the existing regimes
in bid to accommodate ECF. As one of the largest economies and the
most populous country in the world, the potentialfor ECF activities in
China is enormous. Yet, it appears that ECF activities remain an
ambiguousfit within the present Chinese legalregime. As such activities
continue to tread with care in the grey areasof law, they riskfallingfoul
of both the Chinese Securities Law and the Criminal Law. This Article
thus seeks to give a briefoverview ofthe currentECFpracticesin China,
discuss their legal implications, and rationalize the current regulatory
approach to ECF.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The concept of crowdfunding goes way back in history. A well-known
instance of this is when Joseph Pulitzer published an advertisement in the
New York World, seeking contributions of a dollar or less from the public to
fund the installation of the pedestal for the Statue of Liberty in New York
Harbor.' Today, with the advent of the Internet and related technologies, the
modem idea of crowdfunding has taken shape and is now often known to
comprise of three key components: "(1) attracting many investors; (2) who
[each] provide small monetary investments; (3) through the convenience and
connectivity of the internet." 2
Equity Crowdfunding ("ECF") refers to the use of the crowdfunding
methodology as a substitute for traditional forms of formal venture
financing, such that individual small investors receive an equity stake in the
business venture.3 It is foremost different from charitable crowdfunding
(gratuitous gifting) and rewards-based crowdfunding (funding in exchange
of a non-financial token).
It is also opposed to concepts such as
crowdlending - i.e. debt crowdfunding, or an aggregated version of peerto-peer lending - where the individual contributors (creditors) expect to
have their contributions (loans) returned, often with interest. Hence, ECF is
essentially a case where securities instruments are offered. It thus carries the
usual risks of fraud, lack of transparency, and information asymmetry
affecting the individual investor's capability to assess the quality of the
projects. Moreover, given that such transactions are performed over an
online platform that is often less formal or reputable, ECF carries higher risks
and necessitates specific regulatory response.
In light of China's Ministry of Commerce having recently published a
1. Joseph Pulitzer, NAT'L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/stli/learn/history

culture/joseph-pulitzer.htm (last updated Feb. 26, 2015) ("The [advertisement's] appeal
was so popular that [within four months], the World collected over $100,000 in donations
- most donations being about $1 or less. Roughly 125,000 people contributed to the
completion of the pedestal thanks to Pulitzer's crusade.").
&

2. Alma Pekmezovic & Gordon Walker, The Global Significance ofCrowdfunding:
Solving the SME Funding Problem and DemocratizingAccess to Capital, 7 WM.
MARY Bus. L. REV. 347, 357-58 (2016); see also Ethan Mollick, The Dynamics of
Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, 29 J. Bus. VENTURING 1, 2 (2014).
3. See James Chen, Investment Crowdfunding, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.inves

topedia.com/terms/i/investment-crowdfunding.asp (last updated Apr. 23, 2018); Equity
Crowdfunding, SYNDICATE RooM, https://www.syndicateroom.com/learn/glossary/equ

ity-crowdfunding (last visited May 8, 2019).
4. Pekmezovic & Walker, supra note 2, at 361.
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draft Foreign Investment Law that seeks to significantly liberalize market
entry for foreign investment,5 foreign investors' involvement in the Chinese
market will only increase in the days to come. At present, ECF activities
remain an ambiguous fit within the Chinese legal regime. The manner in
which they are carried out today often risks falling foul to both Chinese
securities law and criminal law. This Article thus aims to canvass the present
regime and the prevalent practices adopted in China to help readers navigate
the playing field insofar as ECF activities are concerned, for given the
absence of foreseeable alterations to the regime in the near future, investors,
both local and foreign alike, should necessarily stay apprised of the legal
risks and implications, as well as the actual market practices.
II.

POSSIBLE REGULATORY APPROACHES TOWARDS ECF

In the realm of ECF regulations around the world, jurisdictions have either
imposed entirely new laws to specifically target the ECF industry or have
merely adopted existing laws to regulate ECF.6
The United States ("U.S."), for instance, passed its Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act ("JOBS Act" or "JOBS") on April 5, 2012, with a
stated goal of "improving access to the public capital markets for emerging
growth companies." 7 Essentially, it was to ease the difficulty of finding
funds for startups and small-medium enterprises ("SMEs") and to revitalize
the lull in the post-2008 Financial Crisis finance industry." Title III of the
JOBS Act pertains to crowdfunding specifically, and the specific provisions
thereunder make exemptions for qualifying issuers from federal securities
law, namely the Securities Act of 1933. It further establishes a regulatory

5. See China Consults Public Opinion on Draft Foreign Investment Law, THE
NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Dec. 27, 2018),

http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/news/Legislation/2018-12/27/content_2068862.htm
("China's top legislature on Wednesday published the full text of a draft foreign
investment law to consult public opinion . . .. Necessary mechanisms on the facilitation,
protection and management of foreign investment are written into the draft law, such as
the pre-establishment national treatment and negative list management, equal supportive
policies and equal participation in government procurement.").
6. See Eleanor Kirby & Shane Worner, Crowdfunding: An InfantIndustry Growing
Fast 30 (IOSCO Res. Dep't, Staff Working Paper SWP3/2014), https://www.iosco.org
/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD459.pdf (stating that three approaches are taken
worldwide: an absolute ban, setting thresholds to be met by stakeholders before
participation in ECF allowed, or to allow free market access to all).
&

7. Zachary Robock, Note, The Risk ofMoney Laundering Through Crowdfunding:
A Funding Portal's Guide to Compliance and Crime Fighting, 4 MICH. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 113, 113 n.1 (2014).

8. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 26 Stat. 306
(2012).
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framework for investors and intermediaries as well.9 It further requires the
Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") to introduce rules and issue
studies on capital formation, disclosure and registration requirements for
participants of ECF activities. Accordingly, the SEC adopted Regulation
Crowdfunding, which came into full force on May 16, 2016.
Unlike the U.S., jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom ("U.K.") and
Singapore do not have express legislative enactments that target the ECF
regime. In the U.K., ECF activities fall within the jurisdiction of the
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.10 With the onslaught of ECF
activities since the early 201 Os, the Financial Conduct Authority conducted
a two-month public consultation in 2013 and fine-tuned the existing
securities framework to introduce regulations applicable to ECF activities."
Similarly in Singapore, the legislature did not introduce any new laws.
The main applicable law remains as the Securities and Futures Act ("SFA")
2001, though issuers participating in ECF could exploit the Small Offers
Exemption under the SFA, under which they may be exempted from
prospectus requirements. 12 As for the ECF platforms, these intermediaries
may foremost be subject to the Financial Advisors Act ("FAA"), and
licensing would be required before these intermediaries can lawfully
commence operations.1 3 From the perspective of the investors, accredited
and institutional investors would also fall under the regulation of the FAA,
but for retail investors, the Monetary Authority of Singapore has proposed
for intermediaries to impose 'pre-qualifications' prior to granting them
access to the ECF projects.' 4 That said, these proposed 'pre-qualifications'
require nothing more than that the retail investors sign a declaration that they
acknowledge and accept the risks involved.' 5

9. Robock, supra note 7, at 114-15 (explaining that all three stakeholders - the
issuer, investor and intermediary (platform) - fall within the purview of Title III of the
JOBS Act).
10. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 8 (Gr. Brit.).
11. Pekmezovic & Walker, supra note 2, at 431-33.
12. Securities and Futures Act, Ch. 289 § 272A(1)(a)(i) (2002) (Sing.) (allowing
offerors to make personal offers of securities up to SGD 5 million within any 12-month
period, without a prospectus, subject to conditions).
13. Financial Advisors Act, Ch. 110 § 22(1) (2007).
14. A4S Requires Intermediariesto Assess Investment Knowledge and Experience
of Retail Customers, MONETARY AUTHORITY OF SING., http://www.mas.gov.sg/news-

and-publications/media-releases/201 1/mas-requires-intermediaries-to-assessinvestment-knowledge-and-experience-of-retail-customers.aspx (last modified Nov. 26,
2016).
15. See Factsheet on AL4S' Proposals for Securities-Based Crowdfunding,
MONETARY AUTHORITY OF SING., http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/resource/newsroom
/press_releases/2016/factsheet%20on o20mas%20proposals%20for o2Osecuritiesbased
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III. LEGAL REGIME IN CHINA

A. Securities Law
From the outset, since ECF is an exceptional instance in the offering
equity, it bears noting that there are two general categorizations of securities
offerings in China: public offering and private placement.1 6 Article 10 of
Securities Law, which was last revised in 2014, distinguishes these two
categories as follows:
The conditions set forth by laws or administrative regulations must be
satisfied in the public issuance of securities, and such issuance must,
pursuant to law, be submitted to the securities regulatory authority under
the State Council or the departments authorized by the State Council for
examination and approval. Without such examination and approval
pursuant to law, no entities or individuals shall issue securities publicly.
Any one of the following circumstances shall constitute a public issuance:
(1) issuing securities to non-specificpersons;

(2) issuing securities to more than 200 specific persons in the aggregate;
and
(3) such other issuing activities as may be so prescribed by laws or
administrative regulations.
Where securities are issued in non-public manners, no advertising, public
solicitation or any other covert ways in disguised form shall be
employed. 17
The crux of Article 10 of the Securities Law is that where an offering
fulfills the circumstances under Article 10(2), it would be considered a public
offering, which must then be subject to examination and approval; otherwise,
when an offering is deemed a non-public issuance of shares, the issuer is
subject to publicity restrictions as imposed under Article 10(3). 's Notably,
should ECF activities be found illegal in China, those involved would face
severe sanctions, including criminal sanctions under Article 180 of the
Criminal Law for offering securities without requisite approval.1 9 Since
December 2006, the State Council's Notice on Several Issues about
Rigorously Cracking Down on Illegal Issuance of Stocks and Illegal
o20crowdfunding%/"20scf.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2018).
16. See Law of the People's Republic of China on Securities (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 1998, rev'd Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan.
1, 2006), art. 10, 2006 P.R.C. LAWS 43, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/200712/13/content_1384125.htm (China).
17. See id. (stipulating the requirements for a prospective issuer, which is specified
as a company listed by shares, to comply with it if it wishes to make a public offering of
shares) (emphasis added).
18. Id.

19. Id. art. 180.
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Operation of Securities Business has mandated the strict forbiddance of
issuing of stocks to the public without authorization or in any disguised form,
and the illegal operation of securities business, and an "entity or individual
that violates any of [these three prohibitions] shall be clamped down firmly,
and the legal responsibilities shall be investigated according to law." 2 0
The 2014 revision of the Securities Law makes no mention of ECF
activities. Clearly, even though the size of the ECF market in China is
evidently substantial given the sheer size of its population,21 the government
has taken a rather gradual and incremental regulatory approach in relation to
the ECF industry in China. The earliest attempts at introducing some form
of regulatory framework to the ECF industry was in the Securities
Association of China's publication of its Consultation Draft on the Measures
for Managing Private Equity Crowdfunding (Trial) on December 18, 2014.22
The items considered in that Consultation Paper included the legal status of
ECF, definition of ECF platforms, requirements for investors to participate,
disclosure requirements by ECF platforms and issuers, prohibitions of ECF
activities, many of which were largely repetitions of existing prohibitions
under the Securities Law and Criminal Law.23 Even though this document
remains a draft document to date, official guidance has been introduced
through the 2015 Guiding Opinions on Promoting the Sound Development
of Internet Finance ("2015 Guiding Opinions"), 24 a normative regulatory
document collectively issued by various governmental departments,
paragraph 9 of which states:
9. Equity crowd financing. Equity crowd financing mainly means the

20. Circular of the General Office of the State Council Concerning Some Matter on
Severely Cracking Down on Illegal Issuance of Stocks and Illegal Operation of Securities
Business (promulgated by the Gen. Office of the State Council., Dec. 12, 2006, effective
Dec. 12, 2006), Guo Ban Fa [2006] No. 99 (China).
21. Lin Lin, Managing the Risks of Equity Crowdfunding: Lessons from China, 17
J. CORP. L. STUD. 327, 328 (2017) (citing Shen Lingkun, Qing Ke Observations:
Publication of 2016 Equity Crowdfunding Report, Summary of 2015 Equity
Crowdfunding Developments Spurred on by JD and Ali, PE DAILY (Mar. 21, 2016))
("2015 witnessed the establishment of 84 new platforms, with 1,175 projects successfully
raising RMB 4.374 billion (about USD 660 million) from these platforms.").

[Administrative Measures for Private Equity Crowdfunding (Draft for Comments)]
(promulgated by Sec. Ass'n of China, Dec. 18. 2014), http://www.sac.net.cn/tzgg/20141
2/t20141218_113326.html.
23. See id.
24. Para. 9, Guiding Opinions of the People's Bank of China, the Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, et al, on

Promoting the Sound Development of Internet Finance, (promulgated by the People's
Bank of China et al., July 14, 2015, effective July 14, 2015) Yin Fa [2015] No. 221
(China).
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public small-sum equity financing activities carried out through the
Internet. Equity crowd financing shall be carried out through the platforms
of the equity crowd financing intermediary institutions (Internet websites
or other similar electronic media). Equity crowdfinancing intermediary
institutions may, under the premise of complying with the laws and
regulations, innovate on and explore the business types, maximize the role
of equity crowd financing as an organic integral part of the multi-level
capital market so as to better serve the innovation and business startup
enterprises. Equity crowd financing parties shall be micro and small
enterprises and truthfully disclose the business model, business operation
management, finance, capital use and other key information to investors
through the equity crowd financing intermediary institutions, and shall not
mislead or cheat investors. Investors shall fully understand the risks of
equity crowd financing activities, have corresponding risk tolerance, and
make small-sum investment. The equity crowd financing business shall be
subject to the supervision by the China Securities Regulatory
Commission. 25
In addition to providing a definition, the 2015 Guiding Opinion also
mandated the involvement of an intermediary in carrying out any ECF
activity and further provided general guidelines as to the conduct of the ECF
platform (intermediary), the financing parties as well as the investors. 2 6
Following the issuance of the 2015 Guiding Opinions, the China Securities
Regulatory Commission ("CSRC"), which was tasked with supervising the
ECF activities in China, soon issued its Notice on Conducting Special
Inspections of Institutions Engaging in Equity Financing via the Internet on
August 3, 2015 ("2015 CSRC Notice"). 27 This departmental regulatory
document expressly sets out that these "financing activities are characterized
as being 'open, small-sum and public' and concern the public interests and
national financial security," which warranted its regulation "according to the
law." 28 References were then made to the Company Law, Securities Law,
and several related regulatory documents, 29 albeit none pertained exclusively
to ECF activities. This 2015 CSRC Notice thus legitimized local offices of
25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. Guiding Opinions on Promoting the Healthy Development of Internet Finance
(promulgated by State Admin. for Indus. & Commerce et al., July 18, 2015, effective
July 18, 2015) Yin Fa [2015] No. 221 (China).
27. (promulgated by Gen. Off. of the China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, Aug. 3, 2015,
effective Aug. 3, 2015) Zheng Jian Ban Fa [2015] No. 44 (China).
28. Id.

29. Id. These laws include the Interim Measures for the Supervision and
Administration of Privately Offered Investment Funds, Order No. 105 of the CSRC with
effect from August 21, 2014; and the Securities Investment Fund Law of the People's
Republic of China (2015 Amendment), Order No. 23 of the President of the People's
Republic of China with effect from April 24, 2015.
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the CSRC to conduct inspection on equity financing platforms to determine
"whether the financiers on platforms publicly propagandize, whether
securities are issued to unspecific investors, whether the number of
shareholders exceeds 200 cumulatively, and whether privately offered equity
funds are offered in the name of equity crowdfunding." 3 0
Following up on the 2015 CSRC Notice, the Implementation Plan for the
Special Rectification of Risks in Equity Crowdfunding ("2016
Implementation Plan") was issued on April 14, 2016.31 In particular, one of
its main objectives was to conduct "centralized checking with full coverage,"
where "problematic institutions and individuals" shall be ordered to "make
rectification in accordance with laws and regulations," failing which shall be
"severely punished." 3 2 To that end, the 2016 Implementation Plan set out
several "priority rectifications" to be made, including "internet equity
financing platforms . . that engage in equity financing business in the name
of 'equity crowdfunding[,]' . . . platforms that raise private equity
investment funds in the name of 'equity crowdfunding [,]' . . . platforms, real
estate development enterprises, and real estate intermediaries that carry out
illegal fund-raising activities in the name of 'equity crowdfunding."' 33
Rectifications were also aimed at the platforms that conduct false publicity
and mislead investors by fabricating or exaggerating their strength,
information on financing projects, returns, and other methods; money raisers
on the platforms who publicly issue stocks directly or in disguise without
approval; and securities companies, fund companies, futures companies, and
other licensed financial institutions that cooperate with internet companies
in carrying out business in violation of laws and regulations. 3 4
All in all, these rectifications show that even though the CSRC did not
introduce any positive regulations targeted at ECF activities per se, the clear
notion of the 2016 Implementation Rules was to prevent the misuse of this
new ECF label to cause undesirable disruptions to the existing economic
activities and to negate any mischief caused by the illegal financial activities
that might have escaped regulation by disguising as ECF platforms. 35 In
other words, this was an attempt to prevent the existing regulatory regime
30. Id. para. III.
31. Notice of Issuing the Implementation Plan for the Special Rectification of Risks

in Equity Crowdfunding, (promulgated by China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, Apr. 14, 2016,
effective Apr. 14, 2016) Zheng Jian Fa [2016] No. 29. Notably, this 2016 Implementation
Plan was supposed to have been completed by January 2017. Id. para. IV.
32. Id. para. (I)(1).
33. Id. para. (II)(1).
3 4. Id.
35. See

id. (insinuating that while the CSRC does not explicitly provide regulations
for ECF, it is implied within the text).
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and economic equilibrium from being destabilized by the introduction of
ECF platforms.
Another objective ofthe 2016 Implementation Plan was to further improve
the "laws, regulations, and rules . .
and the long-term regulatory
mechanism" for the sound development of internet equity financing. 36 In
line with this motivation, news released in mid-2016 disclosed that the CSRC
was looking to include ECF regulations in the amendments to the Securities
Law,37 although to date, neither amendments to the Securities Law nor
positive laws or regulations targeted at ECF activities have been introduced,
leaving them subject to the existing regulatory framework. Besides national
laws and departmental regulations, there are various provinces in China that
have enacted local regulatory policies to supervise ECF activities conducted
within their locality. 38 Besides the municipalities of Beijing, Shanghai and
Tianj in, the other early adopters of ECF regulations include the provinces of
Guangdong, Shandong, Jinan, Anhui, Shanxi, and Hunan.3 9
B. CriminalLaw
ECF is also susceptible to criminal sanctions in China, under what is
generally known as "illegal fundraising." 40 This term does not correspond
with any specific offenses in the Criminal Law of China. Instead, the
Supreme People's Court ("SPC") issued its Judicial Interpretation on Several
Issues on the Specific Application of Law in the Handling of Criminal Cases
about Illegal Fundraising in 2010 ("2010 SPC Judicial Interpretation"),
which suggests that the ambit of "illegal fundraising" could cover the
following six different types of crimes in the Criminal Law 4 1:

Figure 1
36. Id. para. (I)(1).
37. See I'
#:tt
)
[CSRC: Actively Promote the
Introduction ofPrivateEquity FundSupervisionRegulations], CHINA SEC. NEWS: CHINA
SEC. NETWORK (BEIJING) (Apr. 28, 2016, 12:33 PM), http://money.163.com/16/

0428/08/BLNNNT6K025 1LDV.html.
38. See FINANCING FROM MASSES CROWDFUNDING IN CHINA 121-30 (Jiazhuo G.
Wang et al. eds., 2018) (listing "local regulatory policies of the crowdfunding industry").
39. See id. (showing an extensive list of the local regulatory policies in place from
2015 to September 2016 and stating that policies relating to ECF activities were
introduced in these municipalities and provinces by the end of 2015).
40. Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Certain Issues Relating to
Specific Application of Law with Respect to the Trial of Illegal Fund Raising Criminal

Cases (promulgated by Sup. People's Ct., Dec. 13, 2010, effective Jan. 4, 2011) Fa Sh
[2010] No. 18 (China).
41. Id. at *1-4, 7-8, 11-12.
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Type of
Offence

Category of Offence

Crimin
al Law

Illegal
Procurement of
Public Savings
(or Procurement
in Disguised

Section 4, Criminal Law
Crimes of Undermining the
Order of Financial
Administration

Article
17642

Form)
(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Illegal

Section 5, Criminal Law -

Article

Fundraising by
means of Fraud

Financial Fraud Crimes

1 92 41

Illegal Offering

Section 4, Criminal Law -

Crimes of Undermining the
Order of Financial
Administration

Article

of Securities
without
Approval 4 4
Illegal Offering
of Securities by
means of

Section 3, Criminal Law
Crimes of Disrupting the
Order of Administration of

Article
1643

Fraud 46

Companies and Enterprises

Illegal Business
Operation

Section 8, Criminal Law
Crimes of Disrupting Market

17942

Article
22541

Order

42. Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., July 1, 1979, rev'd Mar. 14, 1997, effective Mar. 14, 1997)
art. 176, 1997 P.R.C. LAWS 83, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/200712/13/content_1384075.htm (China).
43. Id. art. 192, 1997 P.R.C. LAwS 83.
44. See also Law of the People's Republic of China on Securities (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 1998, rev'd Oct. 27, 2005, effective
Jan. 1, 2006) art. 188, 2006 P.R.C. LAWS 43, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/L
aw/2007-12/13/content_1384125.htm (China) (regulating public issuance of securities).
45. Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 179, 1997 P.R.C. LAWS 83.
46. See also id. arts. 5, 69, 189 (regulating the public issuance of securities and illegal
acts surrounding such action).
47. Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 160, 1997 P.R.C. LAWS 83.
48. Id. art. 225.

2019
(6)

129

UNRA VELLING CHINA

False
Advertisement
and Publicity

Section 8, Criminal Law
Crimes of Disrupting Market
Order

Article
22249

Items three and four are the two offences directly related to illegal offering
of securities and are therefore directly relevant to the very nature of ECF
activities, whereas items five and six are the operational offences that ECF
platforms could face, should there be lapses in their business processes. Due
to the nature of these violations, the six offences listed above can be
categorized into three types of illegality: those arising from the lack of
approval from the relevant authorities (Items 3 and 5); those arising from the
use of fraudulent or deceitful means (Items 2, 4, and 6); and the offence of
Illegal Procurement of Public Savings or Procurement in Disguised Forms
(Item 1).
The offence of Illegal Procurement of Public Savings or Procurement in
Disguised Forms ("Illegal Procurement") is a unique criminal offence in
China that merits specific mention.5 0 Its roots are found in the establishment
of the central bank, i.e. the People's Bank of China ("PBC"), where under
Article 31 of the 1995 Law of the People's Bank of China, the PBC was
given the authority to "examine and approve the establishment, modification
and termination of banking institutions, as well as the scope of their business
operations.
Any private "commercial banks or any other banking
institutions" formed without the approval of the PBC were thus illegal.52
This was first criminalized under Article 174 of the 1997 Criminal Law.53
Some even take the opinion that this offence constitutes the seventh crime
that falls under the umbrella of "illegal fundraising,"5 4 albeit not at all being
49. Id. art. 222.

50. Based on the literature consulted for this Article, there does not appear to be any
equivalent criminal offences constituted by the absorption of public funds in other
jurisdictions; instead, usually these fell under the broad categories of swindling, cheating,
or even corruption or embezzlement, but never as a crime on its own.
51. Laws of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 18, 1995, effective
Mar. 18, 1995) art. 31, 1995 P.R.C. LAWS 4, http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws
/pbocl54/ (China).
52. Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., July 1, 1979, rev'd Mar. 14, 1997, effective Mar. 14, 1997)
art. 174, 1997 P.R.C. Laws 83, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/200712/13/content_1384075.htm (China) (ordering that the PBC is the only entity with the
power to create and provide the advantages of a commercial bank).
53. See id.
54. See Lu QINZHONG, THE CRIMINAL LAw THEORY & PRACTICE OF ILLEGAL FUNDRAISING CRIMEs 6 (Shanghai Renmin Press 2014).
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referenced in the 2010 SPC Judicial Interpretation. In the same vein, any
"illegal taking of deposits from the general public or . .. in disguised form
thus disrupting financial order" was therefore criminalized as well, under
Article 176 of the 1997 Criminal Law. 5 Today, the case law on Illegal
Procurement largely pertains to criminals who procured public 'savings'
with the intent to retain such illegally acquired funds,5 6 as opposed to
retaining the 'savings' due to a promise of return of principal with interests.
With the advent of ECF, it comes as no surprise that this fundraising
vehicle could be used as a tool to conduct Illegal Procurement; analyzing
actions for illegality thus boils down to a matter of characterization as to
whether the monies were invested in exchange for equity with dividends or
loaned in exchange for repayment with interests. 7 Pursuant to the 2010 SPC
Judicial Interpretation, it was further qualified that Illegal Procurement
pertained explicitly to illegal absorption from the "general public, i.e.
unspecific persons" and does not apply to anyone who "absorbs funds from
his relatives, friends or specific person within an entity without publicity in
the society. "5 In other words, the exception to this offence is rather wide,
which inevitably greatly limits the scope of this provision's reach. Indeed,
at the enforcement level, there have been reports that forty-three ECF
platforms were shut down in the first four months of 2016 due to illegal
fundraising, misrepresentation, internal conflict, and lack of funding,5 9 but
none were prosecuted for the illegal procurement of public savings. As such,
it can be said that this unique crime is hardly the main cause of worry for
ECF platforms in China. Because of its relative novelty, the greatest source
of doubt cast upon ECF is still in its potential for fraud.6 0
IV.

PREVALENT ECF PRACTICES IN CHINA

It is not difficult to see that the purported prohibitions under the present

55. Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 174, 1997 P.R.C. Laws 83.
56. Fang Binwei, Jizi Qipianyu FeifaXishou Gongzhou Cunkuan Zui De Qufen, 29
30 (2016).
57. See, e.g., Yang Jiao, flik
54
01iUF43% -ttI '+ ift±) Y* [Equity

RENMIN SIFA ANLI

Crowdfunding in Trouble, 43 Platforms Closed in 4 Months], YICAo GLOBAL (June 14,
2016), http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/1czx/2016-06-14/details-ifxszkzy5230708.sht
ml (describing the unclear legal status of equity crowdfunding).
58. Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Certain Issues Relating to
Specific Application of Law with Respect to the Trial of Illegal Fund Raising Criminal
Cases (promulgated by Sup. People's Ct., Dec. 13, 2010, effective Jan. 4, 2011) art. 1,
Fa Shi [2010] No. 18 (China).
59. Yang Jiao, supra note 57.
60. See Zhong Wei & Wang Yi-chun, The Chinese Style Crowdfunding: Legal
Regulation and Investors Protection, 17(2) J. Sw. UNIV. POL. Sci. & L. 23 (2015).
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ECF regulatory regime result in a very awkward and superficial, if not
artificial, regulatory exercise. Under the 2015 Guiding Opinion, ECF was
defined as mainly referring to "the public small-sum equity financing
activities" which shall be "carriedout through the platforms of the equity
crowdfinancingintermediaryinstitutions (Internetwebsites or other similar
electronic media)." 6' It mentions "small-sum equity" injections, but no
concrete numbers are found in the text of the laws to quantify or benchmark
this qualifier. Also, ECF shall not constitute "public issuances" under the
Securities Law by issuing to unspecified persons or to an aggregate of more
than 200 specific persons, unless they underwent requisite examination and
obtained approval.6 2 Hence, entities that wish to raise funds from a large
pool of individual contributors from the general mass are by default
precluded from using this mechanism; 63 instead, they may turn to conduct
project- or rewards-based crowdfunding. Moreover, if equity is privately
offered, public solicitation, advertising, or the like in disguised forms, such
as "in the name of equity crowdfunding," should not be present. 6 4 In any
case, once a fundraising activity finds itself within the four corners of this
ECF category, the sourcing entity would be free from the CSRC's strict
scrutiny in its equity issuance 65 and be at liberty to look for investors from
the "public," albeit a limited pool therefrom.
61. Para. 9, Guiding Opinions of the People's Bank of China, the Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, et al, on
Promoting the Sound Development of Internet Finance, (promulgated by the People's
Bank of China et al., July 14, 2015, effective July 18, 2015) Yin Fa [2015] No. 221
(China) (emphasis added).
62. Para. III, Notice of the General Office of the China Securities Regulatory
Commission on Conducting Special Inspections of Institutions Engaging in Equity
Financing via the Internet (promulgated by Gen. Off. of the China Sec. Reg. Comm'n,
Aug. 3, 2015, effective Aug. 3, 2015) Zheng JianBanFa [2015] No. 44 (China); Law of
the People's Republic of China on Securities (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'1
People's Cong., Dec. 29, 1998, rev'd Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), art. 10, 2006
P.R.C. LAWS 43, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_138412
5.htm (China).
63. See Law of the People's Republic of China on Securities, art. 10, 2006 P.R.C.
LAWS 43. On this note, the limitation on number of unspecified investors would already
have been curtailed by the type of underlying vehicle seeking to raise funds through ECF.
Companies Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 27. 2005, rev'd Jan. 1, 2006, effective Jan. 1, 2006) art. 24,
2006 P.R.C. Laws 42, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content
1384124.htm (China) (limiting the maximum number of shareholders to 50 for Limited
Liability Companies); id. arts. 78-79 (limiting the maximum number of shareholders to
200 for privately-held Joint Stock Companies, also known as companies limited by
shares).
64. Para. II, Zheng Jian Ban Fa [2015] No. 44; id.
65. Lin, supra note 21, at 335, 351-52 (stating CSRC's involvement is in the
approval of ECF platforms, a temporary measure that was put in place by the CSRC).
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In spite of these regulatory red tapes and uncertainties, the Chinese market
has nevertheless embraced this commercial financing vehicle.66 Various
creative ways have been adopted by ECF participants to survive and perhaps
even prosper amidst the murky regulatory environment. The general trend
today is that ECF platforms invite experienced investors who are high risktakers to join the venture instead of targeting the general public. Amongst
the 'elite circle,' some ECF projects adopt a 'lead investor, plus follower
investors' method, where the bulk of the required capital is first contributed
by an angel investor, who is usually more experienced and reputable within
the investment circle, and who will then take the lead and pull in smaller
investors.67 Query whether the lead investor's bulk investment would
contravene the "small-sum equity" restriction in the 2015 Guiding Opinion.
Sometimes, the lead angel investor would also form a limited partnership
and draw in individual 'partner' investors before the entire enterprise takes
on the final project together.68 In this manner, the funding process would be
cloaked as a private placement in a private enterprise, although these
'partner' investors were in fact largely gathered from the public through ECF
platforms.6 9 In such cases, the 'lead investor' takes on the important role of
instituting trust to his fellow investors, whose ultimate decision to invest
would often couch not upon their own individual confidence in the
underlying project, but more upon their reliance on the lead investor's
assessment of the project's viability. 7 0 However, because of the trust placed
upon the lead investor, it magnifies the risks of fraud in an instance of
collusion between the issuer and the lead investor.7
Another oft-used method is to have a membership arrangement, such that
unspecified members of the public undergo detailed identity registration to
become a named (specific) investor.72 Any such issuance to less than 200 of
66. See id. at 328 (explaining that startups and SMEs in China have long faced great
difficulty in obtaining financing from traditional avenues, and ECF thus presents itself
as a practical solution this difficulty).
67. See, e.g., Grant Thorton, Raising Cornerstone Investment: Kicking Off Your
Crowdfunding Campaign, CROWDCUBE (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.crowdcube.co

m/explore/entrepreneur-articles/raising-comerstone-investment-kicking-off-yourcrowdfunding-campaign ("A comerstone [or, lead] investor is any investor that commits
a significant portion of your funding round - usually 25-50% of the amount you are
seeking. Securing comerstone investment is becoming more and more instrumental in
the success of crowdfunding campaigns as it demonstrates validity.").
68. Lin, supra note 21, at 339-40.

69. Wei & Yi-chun, supra note 60, at 21.
70. See Lin, supra note 21, at 339-40.
71. See id. at 340 (discussing the issues with the lead-investor model).
72. There could be legal issues pertaining to privacy and data protection arising from
such activities, but these matters are beyond the ambit of this Article.
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these 'club members' would thus allow the issuer to avoid falling under the
definition of 'public issuance.' 73 However, the effectiveness of such
'alteration' of character of investors from non-specific to specific has not
been tested in the Chinese courts. Even if these methodologies successfully
enable such ECF activities to take on the characterisation of a private
placement, care must be placed by the platforms to ensure their publicity of
the ECF events does not fall foul of Article 10(3) of the Securities Law.
To that end, some ECF platforms not only take on a membership model, but
also arrange physical meetings within their exclusive club to publicize and
promote their ECF opportunities offline.
Such arrangements are
sometimes termed as 'speed dating,' where large scale platforms such as
AngelCrunch run roadshows for their potential investors.76
More importantly, the manners in which the current practices are adopted
are arguably in direct contravention of the 2015 CSRC Notice. These
practices are precisely the kinds of mischief that the 2016 Implementation
Plan sought to "rectify." The manifest prevalence of such "ECF" activities
nevertheless evidences a gaping gray area that continues to exist between
black-letter law and law in action.
V.

REGULATORY CHALLENGES

The architecture of ECF regulation should rest on the twin pillars of
investor protection considerations and the ease of access for fund-seeking
entities. Given that the concept of ECF boils down to the solicitation of
funds from the public masses through the Internet, the modem arrangement
of ECF presents a challenge to the traditional notion of regulation based on
the public offering and private placement divide. Since the main advantage
of ECF lies in the relative ease and speed in which funds are supposed to be
procured for SMEs, by reason of ECF's low barriers to entry and lack of
complicated procedures, requiring compliance with any such formal public
73. Law of the People's Republic of China on Securities (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 1998, rev'd Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan.
1, 2006), art. 10, 2006 P.R.C. LAWS 43, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/200712/13/content_1384125.htm (China).
74. See id.
75. Ya Xian Sun, Gu Quan Zhong Chou Ji Qi Yun Zuo Ping Tai De Fa IvXing Zhi
Fen Xi, JING JI ZHONG HENG 128 (2018).
76. Lin, supra note 21, at 334 ("Most of the Chinese [ECF] platforms are VC firmlike investment service providers that provide fundraising, investment and exit services
for the fundraisers and investors. They generally assume the role of selecting projects,
determining valuation, publishing the project, facilitating negotiation between fundraiser
and investors through providing road show service and offline 'matchmaker'
meetings.").
77. Wei & Yi-chun, supra note 60, at 20.
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offering requirements of the Securities Law defeats the purpose of ECF
entirely. On the other hand, ECF's method of soliciting funds from the
masses through the Internet is another ingredient that does not sit well with
the traditional notion of offline private placement activities. In effect, it is a
hybrid vehicle that meets halfway between a public offering and a private
placement.
The division between the law's treatment of public offering and private
placement arises from the underlying differentiation of the public retail
investors and the private individual actors. The U.S. Supreme Court
reasoned this distinction on the basis that the former is in need of protection
of the Securities Act, whilst a private group does not because they "are able
to fend for themselves." 7 " Hence, if this public-private distinction is blurred
and the so-called 'private' individual investors of an ECF project are not
afforded sufficient protection, the resulting agency and information
asymmetry problems would undoubtedly be extreme. Investor protection is
thus the key consideration in preventing the ECF industry from becoming a
'market for lemons' where only low-quality ventures would turn to ECF,
while high-quality ventures would continue to rely upon the more matured
methods of financing, such as through venture capital or private equity. 7 9 To
that end, investor protection is the key thrust taken by a majority of the
regulatory approaches across the world. For instance, in the U.S., there are
even limits imposed on the amount of investment that the retail investor is
allowed to partake in.8 0 However, it must be recognized that a risk is a risk
regardless of its quantum, and ECF by its very nature is an avenue for the
masses to engage in a high-risk investment, even if each individual
investment were minute in terms of absolute quantum.
Moreover, the notion of investor protection in public offering is often
based upon the accurate and complete disclosure of information, incentivized
by sanctions for non-compliance. There are foremost inherent limitations as
to a disclosure-based regime for the protection of investors, for it presumes
that investors have the capacity to process the disclosed information to make
informed decisions. 8 ' When put in the context of an economically and

78. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) ("Since exempt
transactions are those as to which 'there is no practical need for . . (the bill's)
application,' the applicability of [Section 4(a)(2)] should turn on whether the particular
class of persons affected need the protection of the Act. An offering to those who are
shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction 'not involving any public
offering."').
79. Pekmezovic & Walker, supra note 2, at 451.
80. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B) (2018) (limiting the amount an investor can invest
in crowdfunding based on their income and net worth).
81. Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its
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socially diverse country like China, this premise founded upon full and frank
disclosure becomes extremely shaky. In addition, such an extensive exercise
necessarily leads to high costs in procuring funds, which goes against the
second pillar of ECF regulation, which is to reduce the costs for SMEs to
acquire funds. As such, under the ECF regime, the balance of the
considerations of investor protection and access to funds naturally hinges
upon the ECF platforms as intermediaries to not only bridge the information
asymmetry, but also to perform a gatekeeping role. Various jurisdictions
have thus imposed upon ECF platforms regulatory measures of registration
as well as substantive positive obligations of conducting due diligence and
procuring mandatory insurance. 82
Faced with the institutional deficiencies in the Chinese ECF regulatory
regime, academics have long called for more proactive public intervention
to fill the legislative gap and to strengthen investor-protection.8 3 The general
view is that guidance can be gleaned from other jurisdiction's approach to
provide a small offer exemption, set minimum requirements for "qualifying"
investors, and impose positive obligations upon ECF intermediaries." In
addition to positive regulatory intervention targeting ECF activities, there are
also supplementary (or alternative) options that could assist in containing
investment risks between ECF stakeholders, including the strengthening of
corporate governance of the issuers and intermediaries, 5 or for individual
stakeholders, the redistribution of risks among themselves through
contractual design. 8 6 That said, the feasibility and effectiveness of these
various mechanisms in managing the fledging ECF industry in the diverse
Chinese market are similarly uncertain.
VI.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Whilst ECF is still in its developmental stages in China, the growth of the
Consequencesfor Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.

Q. 417, 418 (2003) ("In short,

if the users do not process information effectively, it is not clear what good mandating
disclosure does."); Jason W. Parsont, Crowdfunding: The Real and the Illusory
Exemption, 4 HARV. Bus. L. REv. 281, 321-22 (2014).
82. PENG BING, TOUZIXING ZHONGCHOU DE FALVLUOJI 244-48 (Peking Univ. Press
2017).

83. See Pekmezovic & Walker, supra note 2, at 398; Gan Qiang & Li Weinan,

Woguo Touzixing Zhongchou Falvzhidu de Chubu Jiangou, HULIANWANG YU MINJIAN
RONGZIFALVWENTI YANJIU 42-57, 50 (Law Press, China 2014).

84. See Lin, supra note 21, at 31 (arguing there ought to be positive due diligence
duties on the intermediaries, requiring that they facilitate the information transfer as
between issuers and investors, such that the latter can be assured of receiving timely,
adequate and truthful information about the underlying investments).
85. Pekmezovic & Walker, supra note 2.
86. Lin, supra note 21, at 340.
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industry - especially with the technological advances that have improved
not only the market's connectivity, but also the fluidity of cashflow - has
ventured far ahead of the existing legal regime, and it is high time that the
law picks up speed to catch up with such advancements. Under the current
Chinese legal regime, however, ECF remains dubious, with its legitimacy
and the permitted ambits of activities being left largely to the determination
of local authorities. However, the fact that the Chinese ECF industry is well
active and thriving indicates that this degree of legal uncertainty and
unpredictability is still acceptable to fund-sourcing SMEs, platforms, and
investors alike. Yet, the commonplace reduction of the scale of fundraising
and cautious publicity of ECF activities, while contributing to cloaking ECF
activities with the appearance of legitimacy, does go against the spirit of
crowdfunding to make use of the strength of the masses to offer financial
support for a worthwhile endeavor. This deficient legal regime as to ECF
regulation has even been argued to be a cause that hindered the Chinese ECF
industry from realizing its full potential for growth. 7
If positive intervention were indeed the best recourse, it goes without
saying that a combination of measures should be adopted, and sufficient
flexibility must be given to allow the regulators to make necessary
adjustments to suit their regulatory and administrative needs. The crux lies
in the ability of the regulators to balance the spirit of crowdfunding (in
allowing the masses to unite behind a common objective to provide funding
with a low barrier or threshold for investment) and the need to protect the
population from fraud or undesirable distortion of the financial market. In
this regard, while it makes theoretical sense for a government to introduce a
detailed set of regulations to ensure that all stakeholders' interests are
protected, this postulation may be less defensible in light of how the
consistent application of detailed rules is known to be a massive challenge
for China, given the diverse judiciary standards across its vast territory.
Hence, it is understandable why regulators have taken a wait-and-see
approach and have not introduced any ECF-specific legislation, but have, for
the time being, left regulating as necessary largely to local authorities. This
lack of regulation essentially means that the government is not dictating the
rules for the market but is instead giving sufficient room to the stakeholders
to forge forward in their trial-and-error attempts to arrive at the most efficient
way of structuring an ECF project. Moreover, at the present stage, ECF is
largely used by startups and SMEs for their seed and pre-A investments,

87. Qiang & Weinan, supra note 83 (asserting that the growth and development of
the ECF industry in China have in fact been impeded by the skimpy legal regulatory
framework, including the restrictions placed upon the eligibility of the issuer, the nature
of the ECF platform and the number of investors).
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which means that the scale of economic risks for ECF projects ought to be
reasonably contained, and that there ought not to be any disproportionately
substantial losses for an individual or community from ECF projects alone.
If so, then it might not be a bad idea to allow market forces to let ECF
practices mature and take shape first, before regulators take a reactive stance
to impose positive rules. After all, economically unsustainable activities
would eventually be driven out by competition, even without any positive
regulatory intervention.
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